Terrorism Evolution in Intelligence - Essay Example

?Running Head: TERRORISM EVOLUTION Terrorism Evolution in Intelligence [Supervisor Terrorism Evolution in Intelligence The Evolution of US Intelligence: An Overview Ever since the Second World War the US presidents, the Congress and US military has been confused as regards the function, scope and inconsistent performance of the American intelligence units. There have been several attempts by the American Congress and top US Administration officials to reform the intelligence establishments and to make it productive and efficient especially during crises. They put forward various proposals for restructuring and reformation, yet, little progress was achieved over the understanding how the various intelligence units capabilities should have developed and how these units actually function, and synchronize each other. This evaluation of different US intelligence agencies seemed to be a formidable task for those lawmakers. The lack of motivation to assess the drawbacks of Intelligence departments and organizational framework might highlight the causes of failures of many reforms proposed, which resulted in insignificant and poor changes. The American intelligence units as they stand today need a thorough understanding of past reformation efforts to solve its present confusing state. Those at the helm of the intelligence affairs have drafted several proposals and studies following the Second World War to harmonize the American intelligence system with the changing times. These reports have now been in declassified form and surprisingly they have never been compiled and assiduously applied by the American administration in their true spirit (Best & Boerstling, 1996). The significance of these proposals and studies does not wholly dependent on impacts it produced on the intelligence community. However, a few remarkable studies motivated by a wartime period have produced positive results. On the other hand, many other studies were not as useful (Stimson & Forrestal, 1996). Terrorism Evolution in Intelligence: An Introduction Since the Second World War America got ascendancy in global politics and acquired many world wide tasks to pursue its own interests. Yet the American Congress, the White House and its organizational bodies like Department of Defense were somewhat naive of the American intelligence departments and their operation. There was a lack of coherence amongst different bodies of intelligence regarding the role played by each intelligence departments as well harmony to undertake the various intelligence tasks. The unplanned wartime steps taken by the Roosevelt administration in 1945 needed a drastic and thorough assessment of intelligence bodies to be considered critically. After assuming the US presidency, Harry Truman stated in his address “that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly” (Best & Boerstling, 1996). Likewise, many American officials highlighted the need of urgent intelligence reforms: ‘Recent developments in the field of new weapons have advanced the question of an efficient intelligence service to a position of importance, vital to the security of the nation in a degree never attained and never contemplated in the past. It is now entirely possible that failure to provide such a system might bring national disaster’ (Harris, 1995). The major issue for the American officials was how to modernize the US intelligence with the contemporary times. The American officials had been divided about the past war time experiences relating with the suitable ways to meet the intelligence needs. Many of their ideas were conflicting and only some officials had clear views and insight to meet those objective needs of American intelligence. Nevertheless, in 1946 the American administration made various critical decisions for American intelligence units after the Second World War. The National Security Act of 1947 set the course of American intelligence for decades to modern pathways. The American administration did not want to repeat the event of Pearl Harbor. The Administration believed the Japanese attack would have been averted “if there had been something like co-ordination of information in the government” (Truman, 1956). As there was no such issue before the War in 1941, as Truman stated: “In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew” (Truman, 1956). The American administration approved a plan for an autonomous “central” organization to realize the “synthesis of departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level” (Stimson & Forrestal, 1996). The new intelligence symbolized a capability for making intelligence information towards senior civilian and military analysts for a methodical working to harmonize “national intelligence” from the intelligence data available to the government. The Director Central Intelligence (DCI) would be responsible for the smooth running of the organization. The position of the DCI’s was to be independent of American Congress and consequently that would theoretically being a guarantor of the quality of the intelligence data reaching the top hierarchy. The DCI would however, be responsible to a cabinet board to ensure that “no one department could unduly influence the type of intelligence produced,” as stated by the architect of this plan, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence Sidney Souers. He further explained: ‘The evaluation of information is not an exact science and every safeguard should be imposed to prevent any one department from having the opportunity to interpret information in such a way as to make it seem to support previously accepted policies or preconceived notions” (Souers & Clifford, 1945). The 9/11 terrrorism acts prompted advanced level intelligence data to avert future calamitous events. Consequently, many intelligence reforms were put forward by intelligence analysts to make the intelligence communities viable and practicable. The most important reform was the 9/11 Commission that was set up through a Congressional Act of 2002 (Kean, et al. 2004). In fact, 9/11 Commission was quite useful in delineating measures steps and actions dealing with the global terrorism acts bent upon destroying American interests worldwide. The 9/11 Commission applied more focus and immense resources to study the earlier intelligence reports and to suggest many influential proposals to counter terrorism. However, US counterterrorism policies globally seemed to show inconsistencies. It could be termed as primarily an issue of understanding the American government and the challenging roles played by US State Department, Department of Defense, and its various intelligence agencies, other than showing disparities and incongruities in US counterterrorism policies. References Best, Richard A. Jr., & Boerstling, Herbert A. (1996). Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949–1996, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, 104th Congress, Second Session. Harris, Scott (1995). Effective Advisory Commissions: Insights from Historical Experience, RAND Project Memorandum 343-CRMAF. Henry Stimson & Forrestal, James (1996). Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency Upon Liquidation of OSS, 19 September 1945, reprinted in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Souers, Sidney & Clifford, Clark M. (1945). Central Intelligence Agency. Reprinted in FRUS, 157–58. Kean, Thomas H. et al. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Truman, Harry S. (1956). Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 46. Read More