International Criminal Justice - Essay Example

International Criminal Justice Abstract In this paper the writer has discussed in detail the theory and principles οf International Criminal Justice with its historic background. The paper will evaluate international treaties signed for the criminal justice system and focus on the procedure οf international criminal court. The paper has been divided by sub headlines for the better understanding οf the subject. Introduction Reconciling peace and justice in the aftermath οf a criminal regime invariably presents difficult choices that can be resolved only within the context οf each historical experience. There are no guidelines that can serve societies that have endured a governing process that included crimes against humanity and gross abuses οf human rights, but that are currently making a democratic transition based on constitutionalism and respect for the individual. Fashioning an appropriate approach is rendered more difficult to the extent that the former regime voluntarily gave up power as part οf a bargain with the democratic opposition, and yet remains on the scene, even continuing to control the armed forces and internal police apparatus. The Southern Cone countries οf Chile and Argentina pose this challenge in its sharpest possible form, but the same type οf issue is posed for many other countries, including South Africa and several Central American countries. The complexity οf this challenge has been widely revealed over the course οf the last year or so by the controversy surrounding the arrest οf the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet. At issue most fundamentally is whether international standards governing the accountability οf leaders takes precedence over the implementation οf a national bargain in Chile, giving Pinochet effective immunity, and even a position οf Senator for Life. Extending law to govern crimes οf state has more generally resurfaced in this period as a result οf the end οf the Cold War, and even more so, the human abuse arising from the break-up οf the former Yugoslavia during the course οf the 1990s. For one thing, a special criminal tribunal has been established at The Hague with authority over such allegations, as well as a parallel effort arising from the genocidal events that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. As well, through a transnational coalition οf NGOs in collaboration with a series οf governments, the Rome Treaty was signed in 1998 with the goal οf establishing a permanent international criminal court. (Dammer 2006, 100-102) How can we explain this resurgence οf intergovernmental interest in criminal accountability for political and military leaders acting under the authority οf their respective sovereign states? The impulse to impose such responsibility originated in a half-hearted way after World War I, with the Versailles Peace Treaty recommending a criminal prosecution οf Kaiser Wilhelm and a duty for Germany to carry on against lesser figures in a special court established at Leipzig. These initiatives came to nothing, the Kaiser finding asylum in nearby Holland, and the Leipzig trials exhibiting Germany's lack οf political will to punish its own nationals. International involvement between nations is not new. (Grotius 1853, 1-7) The twentieth century, however, has seen an incredible increase in the number and variety οf international organizations, including the failed League οf Nations οf the 1920s, other post World War I agreements, and the United Nations and Bretton Woods agreements following World War II. The second half οf the century has seen a virtual explosion οf governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the world arena. (Weigend 2002, 1232-1242) Despite the phenomenal growth οf international cooperation and interdependency, the world is increasingly less humane. Conflicts generating Nazi-like atrocities have increased since the end οf that regime, (Brown 1999, 10-11) as exemplified by ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo. In light οf the increased willingness among some nations to use such heinous practices, many have concluded that an international tribunal οf justice is needed. War crimes trials at the end οf the two great wars οf the century and the tribunals in operation in Rwanda and Bosnia are examples οf the need οf a permanent institution to those espousing this position. Groups arguing for an international tribunal οf justice were pleased with the acceptance οf the International Criminal Court ("ICC") created by the treaty in Rome in 1998 and looked for its quick ratification by the national governments. The formation οf the ICC opens the door to new and troubling questions concerning the future οf international justice and its influence on national sovereignty. (Howard 1998, 100-118) The International Criminal Court The formation οf the ICC has been a project long in the making. Three trends have contributed to the creation οf an international justice system: the evolution οf violence, the expansion οf the media's coverage, and an increased sensitivity to human rights. These trends are interrelated, each having played a role in the development οf the others. War has evolved from the Nineteenth Century model where armies avoided civilian populations, to the Twentieth Century pattern οf using any advantage, even the mass killing οf civilians, to gain the upper hand. Along with the evolution οf tactics, media awareness οf atrocities has also increased. The advent οf radio, newsreel film, television, and the Internet has brought war crimes increasingly to the attention οf nations that are at peace. Finally, an increased awareness οf human rights has generated the will and the capacity to create change without regard to national boundaries. Each οf these factors has generated an increased desire among nations to find a way to deal with atrocities on the international level. The ICC has evolved from that desire, but it remains unclear whether such a tribunal appropriately addresses the rising tide οf human rights abuses and whether individual nations will accept its jurisdiction. (Weigend 2006, 214-227) Brief History οf International Justice The history οf international justice is fraught with political concerns. Following World War I, the Allies formed a tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II and Turkish leaders for starting the war. The tribunal's powers included authority to prosecute German and Turkish military personnel for war crimes. Though charges were brought against Turkish officials for massive killings οf Armenians in 1915, all were granted amnesty because the treaty on which the charges were based was never ratified. This occurred in part due to the politics surrounding the rise οf Communist Russia. The countries οf the Western World felt they needed an ally in that region, so they rehabilitated Turkey for that role, and past offences were forgotten. The commission did not produce much better results in Germany. The Kaiser evaded prosecution. Οf nearly nine hundred individuals identified as war criminals, only forty-five were submitted to the German court for prosecution, and only twelve officers were ultimately prosecuted. This emboldened the Nazi generation in Germany. Adolph Hitler, commenting on the lack οf consequence for atrocities in World War I, said, "Who after all is today speaking about the destruction οf the Armenians?" (Hitler 1939) The failure οf the World War I tribunals sparked proposals for a permanent international criminal court, but in the face οf the Great Depression, nothing developed. (MacPherson 668-69) World War II tribunals fared somewhat better, but were still the tools οf politicians more interested in global positioning than administering justice. The Nuremberg trials were born in political disunity. Great Britain desired immediate execution for Hitler and his colleagues because "their 'guilt was so black' that it was 'beyond the scope οf any judicial process.'" (Bassiouni 1992) Stalin favoured a special international tribunal just for Hitler, his advisers, and senior military leaders. The United States and France favoured a "tribunal to record history, educate the world, and serve as a future deterrent." The trials began under the U.S. and French plan; however, British concerns that the trials would become a "forum for propaganda and self-justification" were well founded. The USSR used the trials to accuse Germany οf atrocities committed by Russian troops. The United States accused Germany οf deliberately encouraging Japan to bomb Pearl Harbor, thus allowing the U.S. to claim they were victims οf German aggression. (Damaska 2002, 25-31) The trials in Germany were also marked by hassles and delays because the officiating nations had disparate ideas on how to apply their different notions οf justice. Defining the crimes subject to prosecution added to the problems as well. Finally, the advent οf the Cold War left the West in dire need οf a strong Germany, and in need οf Nazi talent to confront the Communist threat. Consequently, the number οf trials decreased, sentences shortened, and many defendants were acquitted. The war crimes tribunals in Japan following World War II suffered similar problems. Although some individuals were prosecuted and sentenced, the process was inherently unfair and contrary to the rule οf law. Ultimately, with tacit approval from General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito issued a proclamation οf clemency for all that may have committed crimes during the war in 1946. (Bedau 1983, 1-11) Despite the mixed results in Germany and Japan, the Allies improved international justice. For example, the trials emphasized the principle that individuals, regardless οf their position in the government, could be tried for violations οf international law. These trials are not adequate models for current situations nor for the ICC. On the one hand, in both World Wars the international allies completely conquered the offending nations. The offending leaders were either dead, in custody, or at least potentially available for incarceration. Additionally, evidence was in the hands οf the occupying forces. Lastly, these were international conflicts where the legal basis for international prosecution was stronger. On the other hand, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo (at present without a presiding tribunal) present much more complex situations. None οf these nations has been overthrown by occupying forces. (Koppen 2000, 14-18) Evidence gathering is next to impossible when the responsibility remains in the hands οf these governments that are generally hostile to the work οf the tribunals. Finally, the legal basis for international prosecutorial intervention is more tenuous because these conflicts were civil wars, rather than international conflicts. Hence, although one may argue these recent tribunals are direct descendants from Nuremberg, they are actually very different. Following World War II the United Nations (UN) was established and the work towards creating an international tribunal continued. Most οf the effort before 1990 took the form οf continuing the codification οf international crimes. Further development in the 1950s and 1960s was stymied due to disagreement over enforcement, jurisdiction, and other issues. (Frase 1998, 773-798) The growth οf international drug trade renewed interest in an international tribunal in the 1980s, particularly with the plea for assistance from Trinidad and Tobago. The explosion οf ethnic and gender crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda brought the issue to the forefront οf international attention and impelled the UN towards forming an international court. The death οf the bipolar Cold War world freed countries from East/West pressures and concerns and focused work towards an institution that had been on hold since World War II. The culmination οf these efforts resulted in the treaty agreement οf 1998, forming the ICC. The creators hoped that the days when one law was applied to the victors, and another to the vanquished would end, and that political pressure would be removed from the court. This hope appears to be early and unsubstantial. The Desire and Rationale for a Permanent Solution Clearly, the problems οf international tribunals in the past, along with the worldwide increase in violence, have created the impetus towards a multilateral solution. From World War I to Bosnia and Rwanda, tribunals have been subjected to national interests and competing types οf jurisprudence. Thus, there is a desire for a permanent system. (Howard 1998, 100-118) A permanent system would eliminate the necessity οf establishing ad hoc tribunals every time the need arises. The decision to establish such tribunals, not to mention drafting the applicable statutes, takes considerable time during which the evidence οf the crimes becomes more difficult to obtain, and the political will to prosecute dissipates. Moreover, a political debate is invariably reopened over the provisions οf the statute, who will conduct the prosecutions, and who will sit in judgment. Such pressures leave ad hoc tribunals vulnerable to political manipulation. (Langbein 1978, 1549-1569) Critics have attacked each οf the previous attempts at international tribunals as "victor's justice," (Pejic 1998, 1-10) in part due to the lack οf universality and specificity in international law. Another rationale for the creation οf the ICC is to address serious, but heretofore unprosecuted war crimes. For example, the use οf rape as a tool οf "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia focused the world's attention on gender crimes. Upon closer inspection, most οf the wars οf the Twentieth Century contain documented evidence οf rape as a tool οf conquest and domination. In spite οf the documented evidence οf rape in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War II, neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charter enumerated rape as a crime against humanity. Rape was not included in "crimes against humanity" until the Geneva Conventions οf 1949. Therefore, the creation οf the ICC afforded the opportunity to codify laws on rape that previously received only oblique reference in international agreements. (Abdel Haleem 2003, 1-8) Fairness in the judicial process is also cited as a reason for the establishment οf the ICC. For example, many times tribunals are organized to deal with war crimes solely to punish the vanquished. These tribunals are, therefore, open to the valid criticism that their purpose is just to achieve "victor's justice" and that the tribunals are in use only to exact retribution for the terrors οf war. As Justice Murphy said in his dissent in In re Yamashita, "If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based on a recognition οf human dignity, it is οf the utmost importance that the necessary punishment οf those guilty οf atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma οf revenge and vindictiveness." Additionally, some countries' legal systems do not meet international standards οf fairness or due process, even in domestic cases. The ICC is offered, therefore, as a means οf standardizing justice and supplanting the legal systems οf countries that are otherwise incapable οf rendering a fair verdict. (Damaska 2002, 25-31) Other reasons supporting the establishment οf the ICC include the ad hoc tribunal's lack οf consistency and failure to establish precedent. The International Criminal Court Treaty The International Criminal Court treaty was signed in Rome on July 17, 1998. Delegates met for five weeks before they brought the proposed treaty language into a form upon which a vote could be taken. (Moshan 1998, 160-170) The vote resulted in 120 delegations voting in favor, seven against, and twenty-one abstaining. The United States, China, and Israel were among those voting against the treaty. The primary reasons for their "no" vote was the broad jurisdiction and the independence οf the prosecutor. (Fields 2005, 3-4) What is wrong with the International Criminal Court? There are many inherent problems with the International Criminal Court, some οf which are unavoidable. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have touted the court as an answer to the problems encountered with the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These problems include the logistics οf transporting witnesses and defendants and having thousands (in Rwanda) awaiting trial with little movement towards that end. An ICC seated at The Hague would solve neither οf these problems. The problems οf transporting witnesses, defendants and attorneys (not to mention housing and feeding them) and obtaining passports and visas increase by having the tribunal outside the country where the crimes were committed. (Bassiouni 1982, 11-12) Currently, a single prosecutor oversees both the Rwandan and Bosnian courts, resulting in the problem οf overseeing institutions thousands οf miles apart. While having a centralized court will relieve some οf the problems οf oversight, it will exacerbate the problems οf discovery in the nations where the crimes occurred. On-site prosecutors have a difficult time gathering evidence. Adding thousands οf miles οf travel will only further complicate the process. A counter argument to this problem with the ICC might be that the prosecutor could rely on the legal structure οf the countries involved to provide the "on the scene" assistance, like discovery. This may be available in some instances, but it flies in the face οf one οf the original presumptions οf the ICC. Intrusion on National Sovereignty Perhaps the central issue facing the ICC is its effect on sovereignty. However, most commentators plunge ahead, either tossing the issue aside as unimportant in the modern world or waving it as a standard that should be held inviolate. In light οf the unthinking treatment sovereignty normally receives, consideration οf the differing perceptions will be helpful. It is presumptuous to believe that all members οf the world community accept the same definition οf sovereignty as the United States. Sovereignty for an American, and for any person from a country based on a similar form οf government, devolves from the people, not the state. Other nations perceive sovereignty as a national right belonging to the government. For nations that accept the latter definition οf sovereignty, ceding it to an international entity is less troublesome. (Damaska 2002, 25-31) However, for individuals and nations that accept the definition οf sovereignty as a power and right emanating from the people, cession to international entities is very troublesome. John Bolton, former assistant Secretary οf State, described this theoretical divide: One οf the executive branch's strongest powers is the law enforcement power. In the United States we accept this enormous power because we separate it from the adjudicative power and because we render it politically accountable through Presidential elections and congressional oversight. ... Europeans may feel comfortable with the ICC structure, no political accountability and no separation οf powers, but that is a major reason why they are Europeans and we are not. (Frase 1998, 773-798) Indeed, in the United States, ceding the "national" sovereignty presents problems that go to the core οf the nation's legal structure. Thus, understanding there the are different perceptions οf the meaning οf sovereignty helps in appreciating the motivations οf both those who signed and those who refused to sign the treaty. It also aids in recognizing the perceptions that different nations have οf how the ICC will affect them. The ICC treaty establishes personal jurisdiction over the individuals in the member states. Many proponents οf the ICC minimize the potential intrusions on sovereignty that may occur. (Berg 2006, 15-20) International law may well be moving away from a state-cantered approach, but that movement is not rapid. The formation οf the World Trade Organization and the number οf years required to come to an agreement in the Uruguay Round οf GATT is strong evidence οf the importance nations place on sovereignty. Perhaps more importantly, the actions οf countries in the past decades are even more indicative that overcoming sovereignty by a single treaty is a mere dream. (Howard 1998, 100-118) Will nations be willing to see their troops, acting as peacekeepers on foreign soil, come under the criminal jurisdiction οf this court? The answer for many nations, the United States likely included, will be no. Nations that would cede to the jurisdiction over their citizens would also face the temptation οf allowing jurisdiction only when it suited their political goals. Therefore, the ICC would find cooperation only when a nation deemed it expedient. The experiences οf the International Court οf Justice and the World Court are instructive. Developed nations frequently ignore rulings or refuse to be subject to the courts when it is in their interest to do so. (Moshan 1998, 160-170) An additional problem that the above quote addresses is the issue οf parity. For example, "while the United States might take satisfaction in conducting trials οf those who commit war crimes against its military personnel, that satisfaction would hardly be worth the discomfort οf seeing American servicemen on trial in Baghdad or Tripoli." Any developed nation would feel similarly. Therefore, the likelihood οf having such investigations by the ICC ignored is high. (Thaman 2002, 207-218) The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference refused to sign the treaty for a related concern. In its final form, the treaty extended the court's jurisdiction to situations where only one party οf the dispute came from a signatory member. (Pizzi 1996, 37-64) The U.S. delegation sought to amend this section, but were overwhelmingly defeated. Therefore, the treaty signed in Rome may violate national sovereignty by indirectly allowing jurisdiction over nations that chose not to be a signatory. A logical ramification οf this is that nations will be less inclined to send troops to participate in peacekeeping missions, therefore, diminishing security in some parts οf the world. Primarily for this reason, although the Clinton administration favoured the ICC, the U.S. delegation refused to sign the treaty. (Dammer 2006, 100-102) State cession οf sovereignty would cut against both states where the crimes occur and those states trying the crimes. For example, the state where the crimes are committed must cede its sovereignty in order for the court to operate there. In addition, cases may arise where national courts try individuals extradited from the state where the crimes occurred. The sovereignty οf the trying state would also be subject to abridgement as well, because ICC complementarity is merely a cover for judicial review. Judicial review occurs when the ICC exercises its power to review whether a state court is unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals the ICC has determined fall under its jurisdiction. The ICC, in this way, may become a part οf the state legal process by reversing or upholding decisions οf what were previously courts οf last resort. (Cole 1987, 23-25) Textual Ambiguities and Inadequacies Criminal law is successful, as well as consistent and fair, when each crime has elements that must be proven in order to convict a defendant. Not only does the ICC fail to contain specific elements for crimes, it fails to adequately define the core crimes. For example, the delegates insisted on including the crime οf "aggression" but utterly failed to define it. Defining aggression has proven to be incredibly vexing, and there is no clear resolution in sight. The possibility exists that there will be concurrent and differing definitions οf aggression within the UN architecture, leading to inconsistent and unjust application οf international law. For example, the ICC may find itself at odds with the Security Council over whether aggression has occurred. This would enmesh the court in the very political thicket the drafters οf the ICC sought to avoid. (Grotius 1853, 1-7) Elements οf crimes and rules οf procedure shared a similar fate in the drafting οf the ICC treaty. In the UN Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings shortly before the Rome conference, the United States delegation pushed for definition οf the elements οf three core crimes: genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The other states involved argued there was not time to do this and that the priority should be on agreeing to the crimes covered by the convention. They also argued that since this was a common law approach, definition οf elements could wait until after the signing οf the statute. Since the conference and signing οf the treaty, the PrepCom has made little progress in formulating elements or rules οf procedure for the court. As οf March 1999, the Commission had only agreed to a goal οf June 30, 2000 to have draft versions οf these rules and elements completed. Apparently, its hope is that states will ratify the treaty without knowing the treaty's final contents. So far only one state, Senegal, has done so. The concerns raised by the United States early in the negotiating stage about elements to the crimes appear well founded. At the March 2, 1999, PrepCom meeting, delegates circulated discussion papers that indicated genocide was still a definition in progress. The Rome treaty stated, "'genocide' means any οf the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members οf the group." (Weigend 2006, 214-227) Granted, the discussion paper is a work in process, not intended to be a final draft. Nevertheless, it is clear in the differences between the two that adoption and modification οf elements may shift the intent οf the treaty. The treaty did not indicate that the killing οf one person would be sufficient to commit genocide. Whether or not delegates would have signed the treaty with the language οf the discussion paper included is not known. Those believing that the Rome statute is the final word are likely to be disappointed. They are likely to be subject to a different law than they originally thought. Definitional ambiguity is also highly problematic because οf the philosophical underpinnings οf criminal law. The interest in ensuring that crimes are carefully defined stems from the widespread agreement that the court adhere to the principle οf legality. This fundamental principle οf justice requires that there may be no crime or punishment without a pre-existing law that prohibits the conduct and sets the penalty (nullum crimen, nuila poena, sine lege). It reflects the conviction that criminal law is intended to guide conduct and can do so only if people know in advance what is prohibited. (Langbein 1978, 1549-1569) Therefore, the signing οf a treaty purporting to adhere to these rule οf law principles, when in fact few οf the details are worked out, puts the credibility οf the court into question even before it is formed. For example, the definition οf genocide includes "imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group." A number οf interpretations are possible from this, ranging from Nazi-style forced sterilization to UN-sponsored birth control programs. The discussion paper from the March PrepCom meeting does little to clarify: "Genocide by preventing births would occur if the accused imposed measures that were intended to prevent births within a group.” Unlike the other elements οf genocide referred to in the discussion paper, birth prevention did not include an intent element. Therefore, it makes no improvement on the treaty language. In order for the statute to make sense, ambiguities such as these must be resolved. (Abdel Haleem 2003, 1-8) Another inherent problem οf ambiguity lies beyond the lack οf definition οf the elements in that the ICC prosecutor decides when to investigate based on referrals from any source. He or she need only convince two οf the three judges in the Pre-Trial council to proceed to prosecution.'" This means that justicability may differ depending on a variety οf circumstances rather than on a pre-determined policy. If the bar οf justiciability is left too low, or open to broad interpretation, the Court risks being overrun with cases οf little international significance. If the bar is too high, the Court is not credible because serious crimes go unpunished. (Langbein 1978, 1549-1569) Court Politics If the Rome Convention is any indication, this Court will not escape the extreme political pressures that characterized its inception. At the conference, when some delegates from conservative countries discovered language espousing a broad definition οf gender, the negotiations intensified substantially. Additionally, some countries became concerned that the language οf the treaty criminalizing enforced pregnancy and enforced motherhood might result in an international challenge to anti-abortion laws. Another attempt was made by some groups to get the delegates to agree on language that would remove the element οf intent as a requirement for gender crimes. These attempts also became hotly debated issues, resolved by the delegates only in the final hours οf the convention. Proponents οf these issues were not pleased with the outcome and later complained that the statute failed to protect women. Another dubious political move involved jurisdiction over terrorism and drug trafficking. The United States and other countries have been involved for years in the process οf formulating the ICC, and had come to an agreement leaving drug and terrorism crimes outside its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, they discovered on the last day οf the Rome conference that a small group οf delegates had altered the text οf the statute to include these crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. This would not be the only issue at the Rome conference decided behind closed doors by a small cadre οf representatives. On the last day οf the conference, the treaty contained a stipulation barring states from taking reservations from portions οf the statute that might conflict with their domestic laws. The U.S. delegation had expected the treaty to include a right οf reservation and was displeased at the last minute alteration. (Abdel Haleem 2003, 1-8) The United States was not the only country subject to political maneuvering. Israel chose not to sign the treaty because the article describing war crimes would have criminalized the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Further, at a PrepCom meeting on the elements οf crime, Israel objected to the Arab States' draft proposal giving a Palestinian state UN recognition. Alan Baker, head οf the Israeli delegation, declared, "The UN by definition is a political organization, so even when you are getting together to produce a statute for an international criminal court, which should not be something political, you inevitably get politically motivated activities." Perhaps political pressures are inherent in a convention seeking to produce a treaty. However, a process that includes last minute changes not subject to the negotiation process does not bode well for the entity under creation. Such actions diminish the sense οf ownership and loyalty that negotiators might otherwise feel towards the agreement because the pact then includes a position that could not have won on its own merits. Another example οf the political pressure on the ICC is evident in the attempts to alter terms οf the treaty after signing. Some groups, seeing the current version as best representing their interests, oppose any alteration at all. The U.S. delegation, however, has made it clear that "key aspects οf the treaty must be changed or the United States will actively work against it." The U.S. is not the only force seeking changes in the treaty. Even among signatories, efforts are afoot to alter it. For example, in the first session οf the PrepCom to establish rules οf procedure and evidence, the French delegation introduced a proposal not fully in harmony with the text οf the treaty. While stating that the "statute was a package that was completely supported by France," their proposal "did not digress profoundly" from it. (Langbein 1978, 1549-1569) Perhaps some departures are necessary to transform a treaty into a working document. Nevertheless, political pressure to alter the nature and scope οf the ICC is omnipresent. Nations and interest groups, opposing the ICC, have applied substantial political pressure to date. It is foolish to believe that such pressure will diminish once the court is fully established. The treaty keeps the door to politics ajar by allowing an elective procedure on various court issues by member states in the future. While oversight and control by the member states is necessary to maintain some semblance οf a consensus-based organization, the opportunity to employ political pressure on the court in the future is troubling. It places political jockeying ahead οf judicial distance. Due to its immersion in ongoing international politics, the credibility οf the court will always be in danger. Conclusion The genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass rapes have been committed long before the judicial process can begin. The international community appropriately desires the end to crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. The victim's greatest desire is to avoid victimization in the first place. Perhaps adherence to the tenets οf the world's greatest moral and ethical philosophers would provide a better solution to both international crime and punishment. Prevention, whatever its form, οf war and criminal action may be as hard to achieve as effective punishment provided for by the ICC. The ICC statute and the premises underlying it are unacceptable, primarily because οf the unprecedented erosion it would work on state sovereignty. Finding a means to prevent crime renders the court unnecessary, and therefore, prevention is the more laudable international goal. References Abdel Haleem, Muhammad, Sharif, Adil Umar, & Daniels, Kate eds. 2003. Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the Sharīa. London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Palgrave Macmillan Bassiouni, M. Cherif ed. 1982. The Islamic Criminal Justice System. London; New York: Oceana Publications Bassiouni, 1992. supra note 5, at 23 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY ΟF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 29 Bedau, Hugo Adam. 1983. "Capital Punishment," 1 Encyclopedia οf Crime and Justice pp. 133-143, Sanford H. 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"Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects," 1 Encyclopedia οf Crime and Justice pp. 444-457 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed., New York: Macmillan Reference USA Read More