Historians' Interpretation of the German Role in Starting World War I - Essay Example

How have Historians Interpreted the German Role in Starting World War 1. Introduction In World War I the participants were divided into two main parts: ‘the Entente Powers or The Triple Entente (France, the Russian Empire, the British Empire, Italy and the United States’ [1]. The opposite side was characterized as ‘the Central Powers which fought against the Allies, and consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria’ [2]. The role of Germany in the beginning and the development of World War I has been extensively explored by historians using different approaches. In most cases, Germany has been characterized as having specific reasons for beginning this war. There are also historians who support that Germany did not have actually any particular benefit from World War I. Towards this direction, it is supported by Hubatch et al. (1963, 15) that ‘the historic phenomenon of World War I has not yet become part of the past to such an extent that no new problems remain to be solved; conversely, time has diminished the importance of some points of disagreement; yet those years were a decisive turning point in the world history of our era’. In fact, World War I has been often underestimated while the second World War is considered to have the most severe effects on millions people around the world. However, it could be supported that both these wars had equally effects on the lives of people internationally as many countries involved in both these wars while their effects can still observed in specific regions within the international community (see the case of Japan). Before World War I Germany and Britain had a relatively good relationship and there was no evidence that these two countries could become the basic participants of this War. Regarding this issue, it has been found by Wilkinson (2002, 21) that ‘in Britain German ideas and culture was viewed as significant; R.B. Haldane, the War Minister, was not alone in recognising Germany as `his spiritual home, for many shared his enthusiasm for German culture and philosophy; German secondary and tertiary education was correctly perceived to be decades ahead of Britain, especially in the realm of science and technology’. Because of the above reasons, the beginning of the World War I was a totally unexpected event with no specific reasons and justifications. Apart from its beginning, the reasons for the development and the duration of this War cannot also be identified. The above assumption was also supported by Higham et al. (2003, 27) who stated that ‘why the First World War lasted as long as it did—why, in the face of overwhelming military futility, peace should have proven so elusive—is at least as difficult a question to answer as that of why the war began’. More specifically, it is noticed by the above researcher that even when the World War I started, there were many expectations that it would be driven quickly to its end. In fact, there were specific military event (primarily at 1915 and after at 1917) that were expected to be finished shortly. But this was not the case. In accordance with the study of Lieber (2007, 155) ‘World War I looms large in international relations theory; the core concepts of defensive realism—the security dilemma, spiral model, and offense-defense balance—were largely inspired by this single historical case’. The World War I both regarding its beginning and its duration could be characterized as an event that cannot be precisely explained and justified. It seems that specific geopolitical interests were related with this War and that in any case the populations of the states that were involved did not want the beginning of this war but they would rather prefer the resolution of any conflict through the diplomacy. This assumption involves also Germans. In their case, no particular proof of their desire for War exists; on the contrary the above population has been found to prefer peace enjoying a peaceful co-existence with the neighbouring states (especially Britain). On the other hand, historians have given different explanations on the reasons that Germany involved actively in the beginning and the development of the World War I. Most of their views are based on different explanations and events. 2. Germany and World War 1 Germany has been considered as having the major responsibility for the beginning and the development of World War I. The above claims could be identified primarily in the text of the Versailles Treaty (article 231). However, it was a German historian that characterized the World War I as an initiative of Germany. Regarding this issue, it is supported by Wilkinson (2002, 21) that ‘in 1962 Fritz Fischer rocked West Germanys academic establishment with his Germanys Aims in the First World War; according to Fischer there was little to choose between the foreign policies of the Second and the Third Reichs; the cynical and ruthless leaders of the Kaisers political, military and business establishments anticipated Hitlers imperialist aggression’. Because of the specific military and political plans developed by the Second and Third Reichs, Germany should be normally regarded as the main initiator of the World War 1. However, these plans cannot explain the active involvement of a nation in such an event which lasted for many years and resulted to the death of millions of people around the world. Other reasons should be also exist in order for the World War I to begin and be developed through the years. In order to explain the active involvement of Germany in the beginning of World War I Hubatch et al. (1963) claim that before the beginning of the above war specific events that took place in Germany could justify this war – in other words, the World War I should be regarded as a normal consequence/ result of the above events. More specifically, it is noticed by the above researcher that ‘in1911, the threatening storm became visible on the horizon while in 1914 the thunder clouds dominated the sky and lightning illuminated the emerging battle fronts in cast and west; the storm hit Central Europe with hurricane force only at the end of the war, when the two powers on the far flanks--Russia and the United States--were acquiring decisive influence in shaping the destiny of the western world’ (Hubatch et al., 1963, 15). Towards the above direction, Davis (2000, 9) stated that ‘Germany entered the war in 1914 a country in which rapid industrialization and urbanization had helped to produce a polarized society, often discontented and anomic, a nation that inspired both great pride and a gnawing sense of inadequacy among its subjects; Germany boasted a booming commercial sector and unequaled consumer offerings coupled with inflation, reliance on imports, new strains on small shops, and a perceived distancing between merchant and customer’. In other words, at the time that the war began German society was characterized by the strong influence of industrialization in all sectors of the economy. German society also faced the consequences of this trend. Because of this ‘transitive’ period in German economical, social and political life, the active involvement of the country in the beginning of the World War I still remains a fact that cannot be effectively explained by historians. Most of them tend to base their suggestions for the involvement of Germany in World War I to the fact that specific political and military powers had been developed within the country and under their influence the beginning and the development of this War was considered to be an effective way to promote their ideas and their targets mainly across Europe. In regions outside Europe the allies of Germany had also specific geopolitical interests that could be promoted through a possibly victory. On the other hand, the fact that the German military forces were not appropriately prepared for the development of such a War proves that the involvement of Germany in World War I was not carefully designed. Perhaps it could be even characterized as an action decided quickly under the pressure of specific political and military interests (as explained above). In World War II that followed, Germany also proved to be inadequately prepared to respond to the needs of a long term military conflict. The above assumptions are also supported by Hubatch et al. (1963, 15) who stated that ‘the true importance of the military collapse of Germany, the change of its form of government, and the dictates issued from Versailles were better understood in Germany after 1945 than after 1919.; thus, in the course of World War I there were elements decisive for our times’ (Hubatch et al., 1963, 15). Referring especially to the period that ‘preceded’ the World War I Davis (2000, 9) notices that ‘in the years before the war, the young nation experienced the power of mass politics and the rise of extremist pressures on politics; in this mix, people formulated notions of what it meant to be German; such notions made war appealing to some; in turn, the war experience drew on and transformed these notions’. However, it is not precisely explained whether the above notions were the only reasons for the beginning and the development of World War I or whether other events also intervened in order to lead the nation to be involved in this War. World War I – as already explained above – has been extensively explored by historians in an effort to identify its causes and to justify the decisions taken by political leaders of Germany and its allies at that particular period. However, in many cases the views of historians regarding the role of Germany in the beginning and the development of World War I can be characterized as ‘contradicted’. Towards this direction, Gerhard Ritter (1969) in his book ‘The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany’ notices the power of military forces in Germany even on the development of specific political decisions. He also refers to the differentiation of the country’s civil authorities which they would prefer for the country to be financially developed under the influence of industrial revolution (as explained above) rather than entering in the World War I. However, because of the influence of the country’s military forces on the decisions made by the German government, the entrance of the country in the World War I could be characterized as a justified event (initiated by the German military leaders of that specific period). On the other hand, Higham et al. (2003, 24) refer to the work of Karl-Heinz Janssen who ‘has called attention to the confounding influence of the German states, which promoted specific interests at each others expense, and made the formulation of coherent objectives at the center more difficult’. In other words, the above historian agrees with the role of German military forces in the beginning and the development of World War I – a decision that should be regarded as opposite with the view of the major part of German population. The above decision of German military authorities could be explained by the fact that Germany had at that period important geopolitical interests in the East European region; interests that should be pursued through the use of military force. The above assumption is supported by the majority of historians like Thompson, Mommsen, and Jäger. However, despite the fact that the World War I served specific interests of Germany, problems continued to exist in the internal of the country. These problems appeared because of the strong opposition of a significant part of the population to the involvement of Germany in the particular war. Apart from its interests in the Eastern European area, the involvement of Germany was also justified on the basis of its security against a possible attack by the neighbouring countries. In fact, in the speech of the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914 it is made clear that ‘in order to guarantee German security both France and Russia were to be broken as great powers, Belgium was to become a vassal state and post-war Germany was to be the guiding power in an extensive European economic association of states’ [3] On the other hand, problems in the communication between Germany and its allies created additional problems to the above country regarding the development of the War. Regarding this issue, it is noticed by Higham et al. (2003, 26) that ‘Germany, like its opponents, confronted three basic diplomatic problems during the war: how to maintain cooperative and efficient relations with its allies; how to bring the war to an end on terms that served its interests; and how to forestall any changes in the military balance that might make victory impossible’. All the above problems should be resolved in order for the involvement of the country in the above war to be successful in accordance with the targets set by the country’ military and political powers as explained above. However, the above result required the development of a specific diplomacy, which in fact did not exist. This issue was particularly examined by Stevenson and Farrar. In accordance with Higham et al. (2003, 24) ‘the best general study of wartime diplomacy is Stevenson, who presents German conduct in a comparative light while L. L. Farrar is brief and incisive; Germanys most important ally was of course Austria-Hungary, on whose behalf Germany had putatively gone to war in the first place; thereafter relations between the two Central Powers were uniformly rocky, as Silberstein and Shanafelt show’. In the long term, the fact that Germany did not have the appropriate diplomacy for handling the issues related with World War I should be considered as the main reason for which the above war did not end earlier. More specifically, as already explained above, all the military conflicts developed in 1917 were not particularly justified and the diplomacy would have been preferred for their resolution. However, the duration of the World War I appeared to be pre-decided with no chance given to diplomacy of all the countries involved in order for the war to be finished earlier. 3. Conclusion - Historical interpretation of the issue As already explained above, the World War I was not absolutely justified as all of its aspects. On the other hand, even if this War was considered to be initiated by Germany, it has been proved during its development that many states around the world had specific geopolitical interests that they were served by the specific war. In this context, it is noticed by Hubatch et al. (1963, 17) that ‘the crisis of July, 1914, found the larger European nations and their governments distrustful yet bound firmly to their allies; these factors necessarily worked against efforts at localization. Austria-Hungary, certain of German support, quite knowingly took into consideration the probability of hostile Russian action; consequently, any limitation of the conflict was doubtful’. In fact, it was soon proved that the development of World War I was not only an initiative of Germany. Many states (that later joined their power formulating allies) had specific interests that were promoted through this War. It is for this reason that the World War I lasted for years even it was primarily considered as a rather ‘random’ event that would have no continuation. It should be noticed that the involvement of Germany in World War I has created the necessary basis for the participation of the country in further conflicts with the countries that formed the Entente Powers (as described above). For this reason, it is supported by Martel (2001, 105) that ‘while it is true that the United States entered the war on the allied side in 1917, thus providing vast new potential sources of men and material, it is also true that Germany had knocked Russia out of the war at about the same time; this gave the Germans access to the resources of Eastern Europe and freed their troops for deployment to the West; the German Spring Offensive of 1918 actually succeeded in rupturing the Allied line at a point where the Allies had no significant reserves’. The above events led to the conclusion that despite the fact that Germany was not appropriate prepared to participate in the World War I (mostly due to the lack of sufficient military forces for such an effort) in practice its involvement in this war caused to the allies of the opposite side (the Entente powers) significant damages. In this context, it could be stated that Germany although not appropriately prepared for such a conflict managed to prove that it has the military and social strength to respond to extremely powerful military conflicts; under these terms the participation of Germany in World War I could be characterized as extremely destructive for its enemies. As of the losses involved in the particular War the responsibility of Germany is significant. More specifically, in accordance with the study of Lieber (2007, 155) ‘newly available evidence strongly suggests that German leaders went to war in 1914 with eyes wide open; they provoked a war to achieve their goal of dominating the European continent, and did so aware that the coming conflict would almost certainly be long and bloody; they did not go to war with a bold operational blueprint for quick victory embodied in the Schlieffen Plan; they did not misjudge the nature of modern war; and they did not lose control of events on the eve of the conflict and attack out of fear of Germany’s enemies moving first’. Through the issues developed above it is made clear that Germany actively involved in all phases of World War I invoking its enemies in order to achieve specific strategic targets. In fact, it could be stated that World War I was caused by the initiatives of the German military authorities – even if the country’s population was opposite to the country’s participation in the specific War. References Davis, B. (2000) Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press Farrar, L.L., Jr. (1978) Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918. New York: Columbia University Press Higham, R., Showalter, D. (2003) Researching World War I: A Handbook. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Hubatch, W., Backus, O. (1963) Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, 1914- 1918. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Publications Jäger, W. (1984) Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland: Die Debatte 1914-1980 über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges [Historical Scholarship and Politi- cal Culture in Germany: The Debate on the Outbreak of the First World War, 1914-1980]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Janssen, K. (1963). Macht und Verblendung: Die Kriegszielpolitik der deutschen Bundesstaaten, 1914-1918 [Power and Blindness: The Wars Aims Policies of the German States, 1914-1918]. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Lieber, K. (2007) The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory. International Security, 32(2): 155-191 Martel, G. (1999) World War, 1939-1945. London: Routledge Mommsen, W. (1970) “Die deutsche Kriegszielpolitik, 1914-1918: Zum Stand der Diskussion.” In Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., Kriegsausbruch 1914. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 60-100 Ritter, G. (1969) The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, 4 volumes. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press Shanafelt, Gary W. (1985) The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914-1918. New York: Columbia University Press Stevenson, D. (1988) The First World War and International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press Thompson, W. (1978). “The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence.” Central European History 11: 348-54 Wilkinson, R. (2002) Germany, Britain & the Coming of War in 1914: Richard Wilkinson Explains What Went Wrong in Anglo-German Relations before the First World War. History Review, 21-27 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participants_in_World_War_I [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Powers [2] http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/diplomacy_world_war_one.html [3] Read More