The Camp David Accord 1978 - Assignment Example

CAMP DAVID ACCORD 1978 There is one decisive factor to judge the success of an accord or an agreement. This factor is what the agenda of the agreement was and whether its terms and conditions were acted upon or not. The purpose of an accord is to enact an agreement that will bring about the solution of the problem. Not all accords succeed in its purpose. While some feel the Camp David Accord was a success, others feel the accord failed miserably. The case of the Camp David Accord 1978 has been debated since its inception. The Camp David Accord 1978 was once thought to be a sway of fresh breeze under the hot weather in the wake of extremely stressed situation between Arab countries on the one hand and Israel on the other. The Camp David Accord was declared to be a failure by the future analysts. It was a milestone in respect of ending the deadlock between Zionists and Arab nationalists, giving way for the foundation of agreement for the opposing parties. However, time has shown that the Camp David Accord would not prove very helpful in maintaining peace in the region. Three horrible wars had already been fought between the two rival parties in the region during 1948, 1967 and 1973, but these fruitless wars could not mitigate the tension and malice in the Middle East. Instead, these wars accelerated the enmity which seems to have no end at all. Arab countries were pounded mercilessly by the young Israel. This continued in the clashes between Arabs and Israelis in respect of the losses in men and material, as Chomsky views: “The total number of Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1967 is 282, less than the number killed by Israels air terrorists in Beirut on July 17-18 1981 in "retaliation" after a PLO response to Israeli bombing that broke the cease-fire.”1 The Israelis took security seriously, showing the world that their military might could protect them if the UN, or the Western world would not. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was the first to acknowledge and realize the significance of the need of peaceful talks with Israel. He was the first Arab ruler to visit Israel in November 1977. While there he became the first Arab ruler to address the Israeli Parliament. It aroused a lot of resentment in the Arab world, who strongly protested against this step of President Sadat. Mohamed Kadry Said states: “After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian security policies and threat perceptions began to shift as a result of the change in Egypts leadership from president Gamal Abdel-Nasser to Anwar Sadat and the emerging peace process between Israel and Egypt. Sadats foreign policy posture and perception of Egyptian national security needs were drastically different from those of Nassers.”2 President Sadat understood that militarily Egypt was no match for the Israel. Israel has a policy everyone, except mothers, exempt religious groups, or the mentally unfit, must serve upon turning eighteen; men for three years and women for two years, with reserve duty until they are forty-three or forty-five or unfit3 This fact means that basically every capable Israeli citizen knows how to be a solider and is ready to be called up at anytime. Every time Egypt was aggressive towards Israel, Egypt ceded more and more territory for the Israelis. It was under these bilateral efforts of Egypt and Israel that led them to sign an agreement at Camp David, in the USA under the arbitration of President Carter. The main points of the 1978 Camp David Agreement include: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. By this Accord, Israel affirmed its willingness to restore to Egypt the exercise of its sovereignty throughout the Sinai. In return Egypt affirmed its willingness to make a peace treaty and establish normal relations with Israel. Negotiations for a peace treaty and limitations on forces and armament were also considered during the talks. Telhami is of the view: “There were four basic issues to deal with at Camp David: 1) a peace treaty and normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, 2) demilitarization and removal of Israeli settlements from the Sinai, 3) linkage between these issues and the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and 4) a statement on principles, including Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and the right of Palestinians to self-determination”.4 The peace treaty and normalization of relations between the two countries have be a success, and Israel withdrew from the Sinai. Problems arose about the issue of the Arab refugees caught in the Occupied Territories which included Gaza, the West Bank, and later the Golan Heights. Even when Gaza became the new Palestinian state, with the Israelis withdrawing, suicide bombers, terrorists, and angry displaced settlers plague the region. Some analysts are of the view that the Camp David Accord was not signed on the basis of justice and Israel was the major gainer out of the Accord. Some felt that Egypt could not make any way in respect of making its demands implemented. Eisenberg and Caplan write: “Based on the evolution of the bargaining, it is not surprising that the agreement ultimately favored Israel. The two leaders signed a formal peace treaty and agreed to a phased normalization of relations that would culminate in the exchange of ambassadors. Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai settlements was linked to the timetable for this normalization. In addition, much of the Sinai territory would be demilitarized, and a UN force was created to implement this process.”5 This ultimately was not true. Israel lost the Sinai, and any hopes to protect itself from Egypt from the across the Panama Canal. Both countries received benefits, but the real losers were the refugee caught in the Occupied Territories whom the Arab countries refused to absorb. These individuals were not Israeli citizens, therefore did not qualify for benefit from the Israeli government, but live in cramped apartments in permanent refugee camps. Camp David Accord, asserts Jonathan Oakman, was an effort to save the interests of the USA. It was the peace process on which the future success of President Carter depended in the going elections. In his words: “Carter had sunk a large amount of political capital into the peace process, and he needed to demonstrate results to save his presidency. U.S. national interest revolved around promoting stability in the Middle East to shore up its relationships with Israel and the Arab world, as well as to ensure future access to oil resources.”6 While partial true, Carter took a big chance on infuriating the Arab world and losing access to oil resources, by initiating peace between Israel and Egypt. Both the parties i.e. President Sadat of Egypt and Israeli President Begin lacked trust in each other. This was also revealed in one of the statements of Sadat. It was perhaps due to long enmity between them as Princen quotes: “While he maintained personal friendships with some of the other leaders, he was careful not to reveal information that could undercut his bargaining position. Sadat complained that after all the work he had done for peace, Begin did not trust him.” 7 President Begin might have misread President Sadat’s intentions, but he had seen many wars between Egypt and Israel. In the end, President Sadat had genuine intentions. He wanted peace with Israel. Both the leaders had doubts and confusions, which also came true to some extent. Begin was the man to tackle the situation at Camp David. Also, according to Oakman, “he was able to force Sadat to agree to a settlement that many considered a loss for Egypt.”8 Sadat had one thing in mind that by signing an agreement with a state which had been the rival of his community and neighbouring states, the desire for peace. However when he signed this Accord, he invited the resentment of many countries especially the Muslim world. This Accord was one of the reason for his assassination in 1981. Sadat once considered as a strong spokesman of Palestinian cause, fell from the position of the hero of the Arab world. Anwar Sadat had more than the interest of peace in the Middle East. The same was the case with Begin. Both the leaders came to an agreement for the cause of the security of their own country, not the region as a whole. Therefore, the Middle East is still burning into the fire of wars and hostility. The recent Israeli attack on Lebanon because of Kassams rockets being launched into their territory is the greatest precedent for that. Oakman views: “Most analysts hold that Israel won the day, achieving security from one of its most powerful adversaries.”9 The Camp David Accord was opposed everywhere. Syria, Algeria, Libya, Yemen and the PLO strongly protested against it and declared Sadat as the traitor to his nation. “The Algerian government, states Banerjee, “descried the Accord as an act of treason.”10 Also, Yasser Arafat displayed his unhappiness by saying it surrender from the cause of Jeroselum.11 The Arab leaders were of the view that by shaking hands with Israel, the Muslims could not get anything. Neither was it a step more towards the way to peace of the Middle East, because both the Arab countries and the Israelis refused to deal with the issue of the refugees/Palestinians. Arab countries want Gaza, West Bank, and Golan Heights to be returned to Palestinians. Israel wants the Arab countries to absorb the refugees. Both sides are very stubborn. Even with the withdrawal from Gaza, rockets and terrorist plague Israel, while Israel control the border and make military missions routine into Gaza. After signing the Accord, Egypt had so many hurdles to surmount still. It was a development towards signing another pact i.e. Oslo Pact of 1993 as well as Israel-Jordan Treaty for Peace. Also, it was the pact to pave the way to make PLO and Israel on one table in 1994. Wikipedia Encyclopedia writes: “In July 1994 the Prime Minister of Jordan Abdelsalam al-Majali declared an "end to the age of wars" and Shimon Peres declared that "the moment of peace has arrived". Rabin and King Hussein held a public meeting with Clinton at the White House.”12 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty in the Arava valley of Israel. It was an historical incident when Prime Minister of Jordan and President of Israel signed agreement in 1994. The world leaders stated that had there been no Camp David Accord, there would have been neither Oslo Pact 1993, nor Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel. 13 For all the good the Camp David Accord did, some damage was done towards the relationship of Arab countries and Israel. While Jordan and Egypt have formal relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and other Muslim countries have shunned Israel, arming the Palestinians for war against the Israelis. If more attention had been paid to the Palestinians and refugees, the first and second intifada (uprising) would never have occurred.14 Some analysts feared the abolition of the UNO by settling great issues in such a childish way. The Camp David Accord, writes Wolpert, did not intend to draft a plan to produce peace in the world in general, and the Middle East in specific. Rather, it was a game of tricks devised by the big power to sabotage the interests of the Arabs in the region.15 That is the Arab perspective. The Israeli perspective is the injustice of giving up land that their soldiers had died for in a war they had not asked for. The truth is war between the Arabs and Israelis have been occurring since Biblical times, when this Accord was signed, many Arabs and Israelis became frightened that peace was attainable. References Ayub, Muhammad . Middle East and the World Politics. 1982.Wikipedia Encyclopedia. Banerjee, J.K. The Middle East in World Politics. 1981. Chomsky, Noam. The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians. Pluto Press 1993. Caplan, Neil and Eisenberg Laura Zittrain. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1998. Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam. Berkeley: California UP, 1993. 431-468. Oakman, Jonathan. The Camp David Accords. A Case Study on International Negotiation. WWS 547- Final Project. January 8, 2002. Princen, Tom. "Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?" Journal of Peace Research. vol 28, no 1. 1991. 57-69. Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics." Double-Edged Diplomacy. Ed. Donna Rosenthal, The Israelis, Free Press, 2003. Said, Mohamed Kadry. The Inside And The Outside: Egyptian Security Policy In A New Environment, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS), 2004. Shabih, Zahra. Lebanon Still Burns. A Report on Middle East Crisis, 2006. Shibley, Telhami. "Evaluating Bargaining Performance: The Case of Camp David." Political Science Quarterly. vol 107, no 4. 1992-93. 629-53. Wopert, Stanley. Roots of Confrontation in Asia., 1982. Read More