The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split - Essay Example

Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958-1962 --- The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split Introduction Historically, Sino-Soviet relations were for the most part characterized as unstable, particularly once the two countries connected as states in the 1600s. Discord between the two countries existed around the Soviet’s interest in China’s borders and China’s dissatisfaction with what it perceived as unfair treaties. Moreover, during the period from 1924-1927, both countries suffered under poorly managed governments. After 1945, Stalin demonstrated a residual resistance to lending aid to the Chinese Communists. However, with China’s establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic and the rise of Communism in China, both nations found a way to iron out their differences and to work together in solidarity.1 By the 1950s the common belief among the international community was that communist China and the USSR were impenetrable allies engaged in a common goal to ensure that Communism was a major influence around the world. There was more than enough evidence to support this perception. Under Mao Tse-tung’s leadership, China formally aligned itself with the USSR. When the Communist in North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea, China intervened and the USSR lent military aid.2 Regardless, by the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet Alliance was practically shattered as their respective ideologies and polices were increasingly at odds. The office of the US Central Intelligence Agency reported to the US’s administrators in February 1962 that: Sino-Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. There is no longer much of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can be avoided in 1962 are no better than ever.3 There are a number of theories put forth by historians and political scientists attempting to understand the driving force splitting the union between the world’s two largest Communist states. Athwal argues that the US’ “nuclear superiority” put increasing pressures on Sino-Soviet relations and policies by first influencing China to obtain nuclear weapons and by forcing the Soviets to look to the West in a more amicable way. Moreover, both China and the Soviet Union had different perceptions of the US threat which created additional tensions between the USSR and China. In addition, the US policies toward the Chinese Communist Party and the US sponsorship of CENTO and SEATO and its presence in South Asia placed continuing pressure on Sino-Soviet relations contributing to the split.4 Haas submits that at the heart of the matter was a growing discord between the USSR and China over China’s policies toward Taiwan. Significantly, Khrushchev had been entirely supportive of China’s “most important foreign policy objective: the reunification with Taiwan”.5 It was widely believed that one of the greatest bones of contention between the USSR and China contributing to the Sino-Soviet split was a series of disagreements over Taiwan’s future. Essentially it was believed that China wanted to ensure that Taiwan was freed from the Nationalist regime and that the Soviets were not as aggressive on the issue as the Chinese would have liked. The breaking point came during the Taiwan Crises of 1954 and 1958 in which the Soviets took a precautionary stance. However, the release of China and the Soviet’s archives in the 1990s illustrate that the Soviets were more supportive than perceived.6 Khrushchev was reportedly pleased to learn that the CCP planned to “bring Taiwan back under China’s jurisdiction” and offered to provide China with both military and political assistance.7 Russian researchers however, do not entirely agree on the Soviet’s position relative to China and Taiwan.8 Ultimately, from the Soviets’ perspective, it was China that had not followed through with a collective and mutual objective in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 by essentially backing down when the US responded. The fact is, the Soviets began to form the view that they could be pulled into an all-out nuclear war with the US by China and left to fight alone.9 Primary and secondary sources released by China since the fall of the Soviet Union indicate that at the core of the Sino-Soviet split were ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing/Peking. These ideological differences created intense friction over how to go about setting up socialist societies at home and the approach to be taken relative to the West. These ideological differences were manifested in different ways beginning in 1955 over Stalin’s social-economic policies. Ideological differences would reach a crisis point over the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis which would only accelerate the split.10 Griffith characterizes the 1958 Taiwan Crisis as the “radical worsening of Sino-Soviet relations” which ultimately gave way to “the point of no return”.11 The purpose of this research is to piece together the factors that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split in the aftermath of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Ultimately, prior to the release of the Chinese and Soviet archives following the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the literature emanated from Cold War theories and amounted to no more than “rhetoric and speculation”.12 This research examines the newly released evidence and takes the position that the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis merely facilitated an inevitable split by bringing into the ideological differences between the states a divergence on security issues. At the helm in China, Mao Tse-tung ultimately wanted to lead the Communist world, a position that was in direct conflict with Moscow.13 Theoretically 1958 crisis provided a forum in which Sino-Soviet political and security ambitions were challenged and ultimately failed.14 This research is aimed at substantiating this hypothesis. The main research question is: How did the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis test the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union? This question is answered by investigating evidence and theories that suggest that the 1958 crisis provided a forum for the clash of political and security differences that created the point of no return in Sino-Soviet relations. Secondary research questions will inquire into the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union. More specifically, this research seeks to answer: How were these ideological differences manifested by the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis? More importantly: To what extent did the 1958 crisis contribute to the Sino-Soviet split? In order to effectively investigate these research questions this paper will be divided into four chapters guiding the research. The first chapter provides a historical analysis of the Sino-Soviet relations, tracing their pre-1958 relations. Ultimately, it is well known that Stalin’s vision for the USSR was to fortify its leadership in the Communist world, while Mao’s ambitions for China were essentially the same.15 Although the two Communist powers would eventually come together in solidarity, these conflicting ambitions and ideologies would nevertheless compromise that these countries would pursue this solidarity. The origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance are explored. In exploring the pre-1958 alliance between China and the Soviet Union, chapter one will highlight the key areas of discord relative to ideological and political differences between the two countries. Some attention is focused on the first Taiwan Crisis of 1954 and the consequences for Sino-Soviet relations. The second chapter focuses on the 1958 crisis and will therefore provide background information on the crisis. This information is necessary for developing the argument that the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union were tested by exemplifying security differences.16 What these security differences meant for China and the Soviet’s political ideologies are explored and analyzed. Ultimately, it will be argued that these differences gave way to distrust and suspicions in an already tenuous relationship.17 In fact in a conversation between Mao and Pavel Iudin, the Soviet’s Ambassador to China, Mao pointedly stated: You never trust the Chinese!...You only trust the Russians! To you the Russians are the first-class people whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb and careless.18 This statement by Tse-tung exemplifies how the trust between the Soviet Union and China was eroded in the context of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. The second Chapter will focus on the events and circumstances of the 1958 crisis and what it meant for the relationship and the inevitable split between the Soviet Union and China. The third chapter focuses on the post-1958 crisis culminating in the Soviet’s withdrawal of “all economic assistance” from China in 1960 and an increase in “border incidents” which “transformed the relations from qualified friendship to tempered hostility”. The increasing disputes between China and the Soviet Union will be highlighted in this chapter and will be connected to the 1958 crisis to the extent that the mistrust bred during that period would be the driving force.19 The final chapter provides a conclusion. Having explored the theoretical and factual background to the study, this chapter will tie them together and will explain how the evidence and theories explored substantiate the hypothesis that the 1958 Taiwan crisis was the primary catalyst for the Sino-Soviet split. Ultimately it will be argued that ideological differences were tested by the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis and failed as evidenced by the discord both during and after the crisis. This research is drawn primarily from primary resources, particularly the archives of documents including speeches, letters and minutes of conversations between China and the Soviet Union. A number of these documents have been translated from Chinese by Guang and Jian and are pivotal to discord existing between China and the Soviet Union before, during and after the 1958 crisis. Documents released by the Chinese and Soviet government departments are examined for highlighting the opposing political and economic policies both nationally and internationally of these governments. Secondary sources are used to explore how this evidence is interpreted relative to the Sino-Soviet split. Ultimately, this research is focused on the recently released archives from China and the Soviet Union as it provides more substantial insight into the factors that contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. These documents also expose the personalities of the key leaders, Mao Tse-tung, Stalin and Khrushchev and how these personalities clashed and added to pre-existing discord. Bibliography Textbooks Haas, Mark, L. The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989. (New York, 2005). Luthi, Lorenz, M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. (Princeton 2008). MacFarquhar, Roderick and Fairbank, John, K. The Cambridge History of China. (Cambridge 1987). Radchenko, Sergey. Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967. (Washington D.C. 2009). Articles/Journals Athwal, Amardeep. ‘The United States and the Sino-Soviet Split: The Key Role of Nuclear Superiority.’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. (June 2004) 17(2) 171-297. Baiyi, Wu.‘The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution. Journal of Contemporary China, (May 2001) 10(27) 275-283. Goncharenko, Sergei. ‘Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation’ cited in Odd Arne Westad (ed) Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963.(Stanford 1998). Gittings, John. ‘Co-Operation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet Relations.’ International Affairs (Jan 1964) 40(1), 60-75. Griffith, William, E.‘Sino-Soviet Relations, 1965-1965’. The China Quarterly (Jan-Mar 1966) 25, 3-143. Gross, George. ‘Communism Divided: Some Considerations for American Policy, Part I’. Russian Review (April 1969) 28(2) 137-151. Sheng, Michael, M.‘Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split’ Modern China. (October 2008) 34(4), 447-507. Tubilewicz, Czeslaw. ‘Taiwan and the Soviet Union During the Cold War: Enemies or Ambiguous Friends?’ Cold War History (February 2005) 5(1) 75-86. Archived Documents Conservation between Mao Zedong and Pavel Iudinn (July 22, 1958) Cold War International History Project Bulletin, (Winter 1995) 6-7. Guang, Zhang Shue and Jian, Chen. (Translated by) ‘The Emerging Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958 .‘ Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 148-206. (This is a collection of speeches, conferences and letters relative to Sino-Soviet relations. These documents were translated from Chinese and annotated by Guang and Jian). Internet Resources Ford, Harold. ‘Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology’. Central Intelligence Agency Studies in Intelligence (Winter 98-99) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html#top (Retrieved Aug 2 2010). Read More