The Logic of the Ever Normal Granaries - Essay Example

Question 4: Explain the logic of the Ever Normal Granaries and how they illustrate Proper Order Introduction The Ever-Normal-Granaries system was established by early Confucian traditions as a means of regulating and encouraging society’s “collective” responsibility for maintaining “law and order” (De Barry and Bloom 192). The Ever-Normal-Granaries refers to a stabilizing program established in China during the 1st Century requiring all provinces throughout China to store excessive grain supplies for meeting demands when food supplies fell. The logic behind the Ever-Normal-Granaries was that if grain supplies were stable, the price of grain would also be stabilize. In addition, citizens in areas of China that were especially vulnerable to droughts and famine would have access to food in times of distress (De Barry and Bloom 623-624; Lecture Notes). Ever-Normal-Granaries in Practice The earliest regulatory framework implemented for the Ever-Normal-Granaries under the imperial government, required the construction of state storage facilities in each county. The granaries were under the management of local authorities. Storage capacity and grain actually stored were commensurate with population sizes. For example, a heavily populated county would store more bushels of grain than a county with a relatively smaller population. At the end of the fall harvest, grain could be purchased in counties where the price of grain was lower and therefore supplies were higher. In order to safeguard against the natural destruction of the grain, a predetermined amount of grain was put on the market at a lower price and subsequently replaced (De Barry and Bloom 624; Lecture Notes). In regions where agriculture was by far the most important and perhaps the only source of food and economics, additional measures were taken. Grain was used to subsidize loans to peasant farmers who experienced a shortage in food and grain seeds (De Barry and Bloom 624-625; Lecture Notes). In other words, the collateral for a loan was the promise by the debtor of a specific quota in grain production at some time in the future. To this end, the Ever-Normal-Granaries in practice, was a system intended to keep the masses in food supply as a means of providing an incentive and a relief fund, for the production of grain. A charitable granary was also established pursuant to the Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian philosophy (De Barry and Bloom 748). This neo-Confucian philosophy emphasized the duty of the wealthy to contribute toward the welfare of the poor and was thus a strategy for the alleviation of poverty. During good harvest times, all cities were required to set up charitable granaries. Farmers were expected to make contributions of rice and wheat commensurate with their crop and store the rice and wheat in the charitable granary. City officials were responsible for collecting the grain donations and in lean times were required to make the grain available to those who needed it the most, but could not afford to pay for it (De Barry and Bloom 748). The Logic of the Ever-Normal-Granaries According to De Barry and Bloom, the Ever-Normal-Granaries was designed to ensure the fair distribution of the country’s food supplies (624). For example, if a county with approximately 10,000 families had 1,000 bushels of grain stored and put those stored grains to market when prices increased, the price of grain would become stabilized. Logically, when grain prices are stable, there is enough grain for everyone. As De Barry and Bloom explain: There is no hoarding of grain by some while others beg for food, no pursuing and pressing by the headman of the village to make people pay back their loans (624). The logic of the Ever-Normal-Granaries was not merely informed by the need to alleviate poverty. The logic of the Ever-Normal-Granaries was also informed by moral reasoning. According to Mencius, one of the first important Confucius followers, the youth tended to behave themselves during the good years and were more inclined toward unstable behaviour during the bad years (De Barry and Bloom 150).Therefore, ensuring that food supplies were stable would also contribute to stability in society. Mencius called the government out on its responsibility to regulate grain to safeguard against instability in food supplies and in turn, unstable societies. According to Mencius, when grain was oversupplied, the government fail to provide for the collection and storage of the grain. As a result much of the grain simply went to waste. Moreover, during famines and droughts there were people dying from a lack of food and a time when the government did not have or use storage facilities to counter the effects of these difficult times (De Barry and Bloom 613; Lecture Notes). The Ever-Normal-Granaries was predicated on the belief that during the better times, grain is excessive, prices would therefore fall and farmers were in danger of not realizing a profit for keeping up their farms. During the leaner times, grain was in danger of reduced supplies. With resulting price increases, the common man carried the burden of paying increased prices for grain (De Barry and Bloom 624).Therefore, the Ever-Normal-Granaries system was spurred by the belief that during good times farmers were vulnerable to hard times and during the lean years, citizens were vulnerable to hard times. In order to restore balance and stabilize the market and therefore society, it was more productive to establish a system in which the price of grain was stable. This was accomplished by regulating and responding to uneven changes in supply and demand in a proactive rather than in a reactive way. The Ever-Normal-Granaries can therefore be described as a socio-economic system that was primarily geared toward social and economic stability. It functioned to obtain more input from the wealthy and to provide sustenance for the poor. At the same time, the poor also made contributions to their own welfare via the responsible production, distribution and use of surplus grain. In addition, De Barry and Bloom explain that a taxing system surrounding output was based on ability to pay (355). Thus, the more income one earned, the higher the tax one was expected to pay. This was in line with social justice concepts in which the wealthy made up for the shortfall of the poor, who also contributed what they could afford. In this regard, the Ever-Normal-Granaries was consistent with the taxing system in which the over-supply of grain compensated for the under-supply of grain. There was both an economic and moral rationale for the Ever-Normal-Granaries. Overindulgence and exploitation of the oversupplies would be countered by taking responsibility for safeguarding the future which was sure to bring about times of uncertainties. Again, during times of uncertainty, the temptation to exploit the poor would be circumvented as times of uncertainty would be eliminated by storing grain for distribution during lean times. This is what De Barry and Bloom described as classic Confucianism which emphasized the collective responsibility of society for the fair distribution of resources for maintaining law and order as well as economic stability (192). The underlying logic ensured that those who were in possession of greater supplies of grain were motivated to comply with the Ever-Normal-Granaries program. This logic was predicated on the belief that during times of want, those in want would become unstable and desperate and this would put society at a heightened risk of upheaval. Those who were in possession of oversupplies were in danger of losing much more than their grain supplies to desperate and unstable citizens in want and need. There was also the danger of losing security and facing interruptions in peace. In reality, the wealthy had every incentive to contribute to the plight of the poor. Some of the Ever-Normal-Granaries were established in such a way as to encourage self-government and community cohesion and this too motivated cooperation between the wealth and the poor. As De Barry and Bloom inform, under the charitable and communal granaries systems, the government was at most, a mediator or supervisor of the system, but certainly not in control of the system (748). Elders in the village, local officials and those who were retired officials and working from home, managed the granaries (De Barry and Bloom 748). Thus these granaries were managed outside of the government and therefore had a communal character to it. These categories of Ever-Normal-Granaries would therefore represent the collective social responsibility logic of Confucianism: working together toward a common good. The government had a far more active role in the ordinary Ever-Normal-Granaries. In these systems, the government provided the grains in storage. These grains were purchased by the government and distributed by the government (De Barry and Bloom 624). The government would therefore manage the distribution of this grain with a view to benefitting all of China. By contrast, communal and charitable granaries were specifically limited to particular geographical locations. The charitable granaries were owned and managed by citizens although they were inspected and supervised by government officials to ensure standards were acceptable. The communal granaries were also managed by those who owned the surplus grain and were primarily established to provide for a credit union system (De Barry and Bloom 748). The communal granaries were informed by the community school underlying the Community Compact promoted by Zhu Xi (De Barry and Bloom 748). The Community Compact was a call for collective responsibility for socio-economic stability. Zhu Xi was especially adamant that mankind had a tendency to overindulge during times of prosperity, only to find that during hard times, desperation would set in. It was irresponsible to overindulge during good times, knowing that there would be far more uncertain times ahead. If everyone acted responsibly during times of prosperity, the risk of falling into difficult times would be substantially reduced. The Ever-Normal-Granaries in general would act as a buffer against entirely difficult times by encouraging the more responsible management of resources (De Barry and Bloom 748). The Community Compact emphasized shared duties in the performance of good deeds, for eliminating mistakes, and taking steps toward eliminating failures or at the very least, preparing for failures. The Community Compact within the Ever-Normal-Granaries system also encouraged the idea that everyone was responsible for lending some form of support for relief during bad times. Individuals were not required to give more than they could afford and there was no pressure to remain loyal to the Community Compact (De Barry and Bloom 748). In other words, the emphasis was on voluntary participation in the Community Compact. The logic of the Ever-Normal-Granaries can therefore be defined as giving expression to a community of mutual, reciprocal and cooperative values between citizens. Embedded in these values was the belief that society, economics and in turn, peace and order were best regulated and stabilized by the elimination of a punitive or superior authority. The active involvement of the supplier and the consumer in the regulating of the granaries spoke to the elimination of a punitive or superior power. Depending on the degree of demand and supply, equilibrium was achieved through the collective benefits of all. Everyone stood to benefit in one way or another. The supplier benefited in that everyone could consume during lean times and the risk of insecurity was lowered. The consumer benefited in that supplies would be available during lean times at reasonable prices. Therefore, the discounted prices usually expected during good times, could be offset by the availability of grain during tough times at reasonable prices (De Barry and Bloom 624). The Ever-Normal-Granaries system was not without its flaws. There were instances of fraud which compromised the logic of acting responsibly and taking safeguards against times of uncertainty. There were also problems with getting the grain to the peasants living much farther out in rural areas. At times, granaries remained untouched for decades when there were times when people were dying of starvation. Complicating matters, by the time the granary was distributed, it was virtually nothing more than dirt particles and thus inedible (De Barry and Bloom). Regardless of its flaws, the Ever-Normal-Granaries is based on Confucian moral traditions and logically strives toward maintaining a set of social and moral values. Confucianism, which was promoted by Confucius and Mencius, emphasizes the importance of building and sustaining human capital, maintaining strong interpersonal relations and living in harmony (Lecture Notes). The cumulative value of these Confucius traditions is the institutionalization of Confucius practices and policies that helped others to live a more satisfying life (Lecture Notes). By mandating the storage and preservation of surplus gains during harvest as a safeguard against famine, leadership was promoting Confucius values and traditions. In addition, the Ever-Normal-Granaries also promoted harmony and interpersonal relations as well as emphasized human capital. Those who were in need were provided for, by those who had more than they could use. This not only demonstrated harmony, but also demonstrated the Confucius value of being kind-hearted as opposed to being purely self-interested (De Barry and Bloom 528). Humanity imposed upon individuals, a duty to have love for fellow citizens and to show kindness to one another. Thus, the display of kindness and love was demonstrated in Ever-Normal-Granaries which required those with surplus grains to share with those in need. The intended outcome was to ensure that everyone lived in peace and harmony. The best way to achieve this goal was to ensure that food supplies were distributed fairly and responsibly. Overall, the Ever-Normal-Granaries encouraged harmonious relationships which required that all of mankind look out for the greater good of society as opposed to their own benefits. The focus was on protecting the vulnerable from exploitation by the stronger. Harmony meant drawing a decisive line between individual interest and the collective interest of society as a whole (De Barry and Bloom 391). While the Ever-Normal-Granaries did not prevent the pursuit of individual happiness and satisfaction, it prevented the pursuit of these individual interests if in doing so, others would suffer (De Barry and Bloom 624). In other words, overindulgence was frowned upon especially when others were starving. It was not in society’s best interest that grain went to waste when others were suffering or there was a danger that the wasted grain could be used at a future date (De Barry and Bloom 624). From the perspective of social order, those who had a surplus of grain would not be resented or targeted by those in need. Disenchanted citizens were a threat to the peace and security and the Ever-Normal-Granaries provided a significant safeguard against this threat to order. Conclusion At first glance, the Ever-Normal-Granaries appeared to be no more than a program intended to ensure that the price of grain was stable and grain was available to feed the masses during times of famine. A closer examination of the Ever-Normal-Granaries reveal however, that while it was an economic plan, it had social order remit as its primary outcome. A satisfied society was more likely to live in harmony in accordance with Confucius values. Similarly, only a society living in harmony and cooperating, could ensure that society was satisfied. Therefore, the Ever-Normal-Granaries was instrumental in establishing and maintaining economic stability. At the same time, the Ever-Normal-Granaries was believed to an instrument for regulating and maintaining social order and stability. The Ever-Normal Granaries also established principles of cohesion and emphasized the collective responsibility of individuals in society for ensuring the fair distribution of human capital and natural resources as a means of establishing and maintaining economic and social equilibrium. Works Cited De Barry, William Theodore, and Irene Bloom. Sources of Chinese Tradition from Earliest Times to 1600, Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Print. Lecture Notes. POLI 113A – E. Asia Thought/Comp Perspective – LE [A00]. UC San Diego, 9/30/2013. Web. 2 Nov. 2013. . Read More