Legal-business auto accidents - Term Paper Example

Honda Motor Company, “where the court ruled that the regulation foreclosed the filing of injury suits under the state law by the people contending that manufacturers had made the wrong choice” (Liptak). II. Facts of the Case: Petitioner, Alexis Geier, was driving a 1987 Honda Accord, which collided in a tree and caused the petitioner serious physical injuries, despite the fact that the shoulder and lap belts were fastened at the time the accident happened. The car was not also equipped with airbags.

Petitioner, together with her parents, sued American Honda Motor Company, Inc. before the District of Columbia tort law, on the ground that Honda negligently was remiss in its obligation as a car manufacturer for failure to set an airbag at the driver’s side. The Court dismissed the case on the ground that it was the discretion of Honda to whether or not install an airbag in its car models. Hence, this ruling concluded that it was not mandatory for the automakers to install a passenger-side airbag, and shall not be liable for a personal injury case based on such ground.

The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision of the District Court which resulted to a dismissal of the case. Thus, an appeal to the Supreme Court was filed by the petitioners. . s in conflict with the existing provisions of FMVS 208 Act, particularly on the express pre-emption provision Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that: With regard to the first issue, the court held that the ordinary principles of pre-emption shall not apply in the case of the petitioners. The provision contained in the Act states that the federal safety standard does not relieve a person from any liability on the basis of the common law.

Hence, the petitioners are not precluded from setting up a claim against American Honda. The language of the provision clause enacted by Congress does not prohibit common-law actions. The spirit of the law must be followed and not its literal meaning of the law. In case of doubt, the intention of the law must prevail over the strict context of the law. Thus, “express pre-emption provision that excludes common-law tort actions gives actual meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leaving adequate room for state tort law to operate” (Cornell).

For the second issue, the Court held that ordinary pre-emption principles apply in the case of the petitioners. In its decision, the Court anchored its conclusion on the basis of “the express pre-emption and saving provisions when taken together, shall create a “special burden,” which a court must impose “on a party” who claims conflict pre-emption under those principles. A “special burden” would also promise practical difficulty by further complicating well-established pre-emption principles that already are difficult to apply” (Cornell).

In one of the dissent of the justices, one justice commented that if the “special burden” would be made applicable in such a case, where the state law penalizes the requirement of the federal law which is an absolute